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Abstract Basic schemes and databases necessary to assess the radioactive release 
in severe accidents at nuclear power plants are presented. The approaches include 
one based on the physical and chemical properties of the core fuel, and another 
based on the radiation monitor. Trials of the rough evaluation for the severe acci-
dent at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station are made using both approaches 
without relying on specialized computer simulations for educational purposes, 
even though the exact values will be less reliable. The results were compared 
with the official statements by the authorities for both cases, and confirmed to be 
nevertheless fairly consistent with each other. This fact implies that these “man-
ual calculation-based” approaches are practically useful, especially for accidents 
where detailed simulation results have not yet come out, or are still unavailable 
or ambiguous. Background of the database, such as atmospheric diffusion, flash 
boiling, and radiological equivalence including dose factor, are described in the 
appendixes.
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3.1  Introduction
Located at the Fukushima Daiichi (1F) nuclear power station (NPS) are six 
nuclear power plants. Among them, Units 1, 2, and 3 (referred to hereafter as 1F1, 
1F2, and 1F3, respectively) had major accidents resulting from the earthquake and 
tsunami on March 11, 2011. Units 1, 2, and 3 encountered station blackout (SBO), 
i.e., loss of all alternating current (AC) power including emergency diesel genera-
tor, back-up battery depletion, and emergency cooling system failure. Response to 
the accident faced severe difficulties in removing the decay heat of the fuel and 
oxidization heat of the fuel rods made by Zircaloy (see Chap. 2 of this volume). 
Finally, core melt of the fuel rods occurred. What was worse, the fuel materials 
further melted through the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs), which led to a consid-
erable amount of leakage of the radioactive materials to the environment.
Information necessary to evaluate (or even to speculate) the degree of serious-
ness of the accident seemed to be insufficient, since it was limited, undisclosed, or 
uncertain, especially in the early stage of the accident. Even under such circum-
stances, one could only rely on the inventory calculated from the operation history 
of each unit, together with the physical and chemical properties of the materials, 
and ambient dose rate monitored by the government, electric power companies, or 
nuclear facilities in research institutes or in universities.1
The purpose of this chapter is thus to introduce some background information 
for scientific analysis of the release of radioactive materials from the Fukushima 
Daiichi NPS based on their inventory in the reactor core, mechanisms of the 
release, and the behavior of the released radionuclide. The state of contamination 
and decontamination of the area is also briefly mentioned.
3.2  Methods of Analysis
3.2.1  General Concepts for Various Models
The image of the damage and the pathways of the radioactive materials are shown 
schematically in Fig. 3.1. These events, together with the leakage of the primary 
containment vessels (PCVs), caused significant release of radionuclides to the 
environment.
The real situation was far more complicated. Thermally damaged top-head 
flanges, cracks in pipe inlets in the PCV, and vent pipes between the PCV and the 
1
 Note that the data evaluated here have considerable ambiguities; thus the authors would like 
to suggest that readers take them as examples for study of methodology of the analysis from the 
limited availability of information and data. Indeed, up to now (as of 2014), the data reported by 
the government, TEPCO, etc., have been frequently updated.
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suppression chamber (SC) have been regarded as possible leak paths. Indeed, three 
units exhibited different features of cooling failure (see Chap. 2 of this volume).
Figure 3.2 shows schematically the behavior of radioactive materials in the 
environment after their release from the reactor facility. In order to assess the 
direct effects of the radioactive release to the environment, we must make use of 
the inventory of radionuclides and chemical elements in the fuel just before the 
accident; release from the fuel at the accident; existence states of radionuclides 
in the RPV, PCV, and reactor building; release from the stack or reactor building; 
migration in the atmosphere; contamination of soil; and ambient dose rate from 
radionuclides in the soil and in the atmosphere.
There are basically two approaches to evaluating the amount of environmen-
tal release of radionuclides. One is based on analysis of the physical and chemi-
cal conditions of the core fuel. In this approach, a fraction of the released amount 
is approximated with certain plausible values. The other is based on “radiation 
mapping” made by monitoring the excess ambient dose rate and/or radioactivity 
measurement of the contaminated soils. The former is an indirect method because 
Fig. 3.1  Schematic drawing of the reactor damage and behavior of radioactive materials
54 S. Tanaka and S. Kado
the radioactive species need to be assumed from other information or knowledge. 
However, in the early stages of the accident it is more convenient than the latter.
3.2.2  Model 1: Release from Fuel with Known/Assumed 
Inventory
Amounts of radionuclides, such as fission products (FPs), uranium (U), pluto-
nium (Pu), and minor actinides (MAs) in the reactor fuel need to be evaluated. 
Information about the chemical elements is also important for the stoichiometric 
estimation of the chemical forms of released fission products. This can be calcu-
lated with the help of the ORIGEN code [1], which is based on the theory of pro-
duction and the following radioactive decay of FPs and MAs.
A cause for release of radioactive materials at all reactors was that decay 
heat of fission products had not been eliminated due to loss of the cooling func-
tion. Consequently, the fuel rods were exposed to steam and the fuel and 
cladding were heated up, which resulted in generation of hydrogen gas by 
chemical reaction between zirconium and steam above 900 °C. The reaction 
Zr+ 2H2O→ ZrO2 + 2H2 produces hydrogen, which caused the subsequent 
hydrogen explosions. It also produces heat because this reaction is exothermic. 
This heat accelerates the heating of the fuel combined with decay heat. At high 
temperatures uranium made an eutectic compound with zirconium. The melting 
point of this eutectic is lower than uranium oxide. Figure 3.3 shows high tempera-
ture phenomena of the fuel relating to the core-melt progression [2, 3]. Some radi-
oactive materials in the fuel soluble in UO2 were released following heating and 
melting of the fuel. The fraction of released radioactive materials from the heated 
Fig. 3.2  Radioactive materials in the environment
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fuel depends on the vapor pressure (i.e., melting point) and diffusivity in the fuel. 
These behaviors are strongly dependent on the temperature. A release rate constant 
k [min−1] as a function of the temperature T [K] is given by
where Q is the activation energy [kcal/mol], and R = 0.001987 kcal/mol K the uni-
versal gas constant.
Although Q depends on the chemical species, Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL) and others proposed, in their CORSOR-O model [4], to use the com-
mon Q of 55 kcal/mol for all species and the dependence on the species is rep-
resented by the empirically corrected k0. For example, k0 = 12,000 min−1 for 
Cs and Kr while it is 9,600 min−1[= 0.8 × k0 (Cs)] for I and Te. The results are 
shown in Fig. 3.4.
Using the CORSOR-O model, the fraction of inventory released from the fuel 
at time t is obtainable. Taking Cs as an example for calculation, the fractions of 
inventory released at 1,800 °C are: F = 90 % at t = 2 h; and F = 100 % at t = 4 h.
3.2.3  Model 2: Codes for Severe Accident Progression 
Analysis
Computer codes have been developed to analyze or predict the progression of 
severe accidents. Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) was developed 
(3.1)k = k0 exp(−Q/RT),
Fig. 3.3  High temperature phenomena in the core [2, 3]
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by U.S. industries while MELCOR was developed by the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (US NRC) [5].
These codes basically calculate the thermal response of the core, dealing with 
the entire progression from the initiating event to the radionuclide releases to the 
environment, which is called the “source term.” Therefore, the initial inventory 
and the release properties for each nuclide are required as input parameters. These 
values are usually calculated by a burn-up code, such as ORIGEN or CORSOR. 
The entire progression from the initial event includes damage in the RPV and PCV 
and consequent leakage of water and steam.
After the accident, another code named “Severe Accident analysis code 
with Mechanistic, Parallelized Simulations Oriented towards Nuclear fields 
(SAMPSON)” [6], developed by Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation 
(NUPEC), has been improved by Institute of Applied Energy in Japan. The merit 
of the SAMPSON code is the fact that there is no factor adjusted by the user.
3.2.4  Model 3: Atmospheric Transport Model
Behavior of the radioactive materials released from a nuclear facility differs 
depending on their chemical properties, weather conditions (e.g., wind direction, 
wind speed, rainfall, snowfall), and the geography around the plant. Noble gases 
Fig. 3.4  Temperature 
dependence of release rate 
constants from UO2 fuel
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such as Kr or Xe are transported and dispersed by wind. If upward wind is pre-
dominant, the gases will be transported to the stratosphere and delivered across the 
entire earth by the wind. Gases of volatile radioactive materials such as I2 are also 
transported by the wind. CsI or Cs oxides can be transported by the wind if these 
nuclides float in the air as dust particles or attach to aerosols. This is called the 
“plume” as schematically shown in Fig. 3.2.
If rain or snow falls, some particles will fall to the surface of the earth together 
with raindrops (wash-out or rain-out) and contaminate the land. Therefore, predic-
tion of the transport of radionuclides, i.e., evolution of the plume, is crucial for 
protecting local residents from radiation. Note, in contrast, that relatively large 
particles such as fuel grains are rather difficult to be transported far by the wind, 
so they tend to fall out by gravity near the NPS.
The time-integrated concentration of the released nuclides in the atmosphere, 
χ(x, y, z) [Bq/m3], can be formulated by the Gaussian model as:
where Γ is the release rate at source [Bq/s], U the mean wind speed in the x direc-
tion [m/s], h the physical height where the plume comes out [7]. The diffusion 
parameters, σy and σz, represent the broadening in the transverse and vertical 
direction, respectively. Their values can be found in the data chart known as the 
Pasquill-Gifford diagram shown in Fig. 3.5, which categorizes air-stability into 6 
classes, A-F, depending on local solar radiation and surface wind speed [7]. One 
can see from this figure that the lateral spread of the plume is only 1/10–1/100 the 
(3.2)





















Fig. 3.5  Pasquill-Gifford dispersion diagrams: a horizontal dispersion, ground sources; b verti-
cal dispersion, ground sources. In Japan, an extremely stable class G is added to classes A–F (see 
Appendix A of this chapter)
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travel distance necessary to deliver local effects to the environment. Nevertheless, 
the atmospheric diffusions are larger than that deduced from molecular collisional 
diffusion, since the turbulent flows enhance the net diffusion.
Because Eq. (3.2) is only applicable to the simple condition, i.e., flat topogra-
phy and temporally and spatially constant wind, it is not suitable for the real-time 
simulation of atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides during emergency. Thus, 
more sophisticated model is used for this purpose. The System for Prediction of 
Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) [8] predicts the atmos-
pheric dispersion and deposition of released radionuclides in the local and regional 
areas by solving the transport and diffusion equation numerically in which three-
dimensional meteorological fields and topography are considered explicitly. A 
worldwide version of SPEEDI (WSPEEDI) [9] can predict in detail the process of 
the atmospheric dispersion and deposition of released radioactive materials over 
the world for overseas accident.
The behavior of radioactive materials released to the ocean is evaluated from 
transportation and dispersion along the ocean current, dispersion by the tidal 
stream and wind, precipitation to the bottom of the sea, and intake by fishes and 
their migration. The compartment model is used for evaluation of the contami-
nation in the ocean. The amount of release directly to the ocean as contaminated 
water is not included in the assessment of the accident scale.
3.2.5  Model 4: Ambient Dose Rate from the Contaminated 
Ground
The total release of the radioactive material, that is the integral of the source term 
with respect to the period of release, can be roughly evaluated from the ground 
contamination caused by the fallout/rainout/washout after the radiation plume has 
passed through, based on the following equations.






















(3.6)si = Aj(ts)Land + ocean
Land
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CFgrd is the conversion factor from ground contamination to the ambient dose 
rate at 1 m above the ground, [(Sv/h)/(Bq/m2)] shown in Fig. 3.6, while SF is the 
shielding factor depending on the ground condition, location, or buildings. We 
determined that SF = 0.7 is a plausible value to be applied in the present situa-
tion (see Appendix C). τ is the half life of the radioactivity. tcom, tobs and ts are 
the times when the species ratio is determined, when the dose rate was measured, 
and when the radioactive species are released, respectively. Note that the subscript 
j is the label of the species and 131I (τ = 8.02 d), 134Cs (τ = 752.4 d), and 137Cs 
(τ = 11019.3 d) in the present case.
3.3  Occurrence of the Accident and Release, Transport, 
and Washout of the Radiation Plume
From the severe-accident analysis based on the MAAP or MELCOR code, it is 
reported that the core damage incident for each unit happened approximately at 
the period listed in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.7 shows the temporal evolution of the ambient dose rate observed 
inside the 1F site, in nearby and distant cities, together with the wind conditions 
Fig. 3.6  Schematic drawing 
of evaluation of dose rate 
based on the ground shine
Table 3.1  Core damage progression simulated by MAAP and MELCOR codes
Hours from scram (March 11, 2011, 14:46 JST)
Simulation analysis Unit 1F1 1F2 1F3
MAAP code (TEPCO) Core exposure 3 h 75 h 40 h
Core damage 4 h 77 h 42 h
RPV melt-through 15 h 109 h 66 h
MELCOR code (NISA) Core exposure 2 h 75 h 41 h
Core damage 3 h 77 h 44 h
RPV melt-through 5 h 80 h 79 h
Actual events IC/RCIC stopped 2 h 50 70 h 39 35 h 56
Vent (AO valve) 23 h 44 Failed? 42 h 30
Explosion/rupture 24 h 50 77 h 68 h 12
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 U-Tokyo Tokai 1
 U-Tokyo Hongo B
 Tokyo_Shinjuku
 Shizuoka_Shizuoka
1Fsite  1FGateM 1km
< 100 km
>100 km
Fig. 3.7  Temporal evolution of the ambient dose rate at a 1F monitoring post, c nearby, and 
d distant, b wind direction indicated by sine and cosine components (data from the University 
Tokyo and those publicly released by TEPCO and MEXT)
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at the 1F monitoring posts (MPs). Note that in 1F, a monitoring car was used 
because the MPs were not working due to the power failure. The direction and 
speed of the wind were recorded with a 16 point compass, e.g. north (N), north-
northwest (NNW), northwest (NW), west-northwest (WNW), south (S), east (E), 
etc., at the same time as the radiation dose rate at the monitoring posts/car in 1F. 
In order to compare the temporal evolution of the wind vector with other events, 
we represented the wind direction θ as the sine and cosine components of the 
direction (orienting to the east being 0°, while orienting to the north being 90°). 
In the present analysis, sin(θ) > 0 corresponds to the direction from the land to 
the ocean, while cos(θ) < 0 corresponds to the direction to the south (toward 
Tokyo).
At the 1F site, the dose rate began to increase from 4:04 on March 12 (13 h 
after scram), which presumably coincides with the incidents in 1F1 (Fig. 3.7, A). 
First, venting and the following hydrogen explosion was presumed to be the cause 
of the increase in the dose rate in Minami-sōma, 26 km north of 1F, on March 12 
(Fig. 3.7, B). Note, however, that precise data recorded every 20 s (telemeter sys-
tem) disclosed in November 2013 revealed that the rapid increase of dose rate at 
Kamihatori 6 km north west of 1F coincided with the attempt to vent around 14:30 
while the hydrogen explosion at 15:36 did not cause apparent increase in the dose 
rate around 1F.
The core damage incident in 1F3 occurred on March 13. The venting of the 
PCV of 1F3 was operated several times in the depressurizing procedure of the 
RPV during March 13 and 14, and the hydrogen explosion occurred at 11:01 
on March 14 (68 h after scram). The fact that the wind was directed to the east 
(sea direction) during this period was, so to say, one consolation in the disaster 
(Fig. 3.7, C). However, the release of the radioactive materials in this event was 
considerably smaller than the following incident in 1F2.
The incident at 1F2 caused the most serious release of radioactive nuclides. 
The suspected leakage of the PCV caused the release of radioactive gases around 
21:30 on March 14 (Fig. 3.7, D1), which was several hours before detection of the 
sound of the explosion or rupture at the suppression chamber (SC) of 1F2 (at 6:10) 
(Fig. 3.7, D2). Note that for that time, we have not enough evidence to tell whether 
the event was an explosion or a rupture. On October 2, 2011, it was reported 
that the accident investigation commission of Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO) determined from the signals recorded on a quake meter that the hydro-
gen explosion might not have occurred in 1F2. It is more likely that the sound was 
delivered from the hydrogen explosion at 1F4, presumably caused by the escaped 
hydrogen from 1F3 through a duct.
The radioactive leakage from 1F2 in this period (Fig. 3.7, D1), presum-
ably caused by opening the safety relief valves (SRVs) followed by the leakage 
through the damaged PCV, initiated the radiation plume toward the South direc-
tion, and the increase in ambient dose was observed as the plume propagated and 
passed through the locations at a speed of about 10 km/h (Fig. 3.7, E). The radia-
tion plume was observed even in Tokyo (SW 230 km of 1F) and Shizuoka (SW 
360 km).
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Note that by using SRVs to depressurize the RPV, external water injection 
becomes possible. However, flash boiling (see Appendix B) can accelerate the core 
exposure. SRV operation after core damage can therefore cause a significant trans-
port of radioactive materials out of the RPV into the SC.
Figure 3.8 shows the temporal evolution of the ambient dose observed at differ-
ent locations after the initial prominent radioactive release on March 15.
[North <50 km from 1F]
The plume on March 15 (Fig. 3.7, D1) soon passed and the ambient dose rate 
decreased rapidly, particularly in distant locations. However, the plume initiated 
by the SC rupture (Fig. 3.7, D2), propagated to the Northwest direction and caused 
fallout/washout/rainout due to rainfall and/or snowfall. This contributed to the 
significant increase in dose rates in these areas, such as Iitate-mura (NW 40 km) 
(Fig. 3.8, F).
Although the origin of the later peaks at the main gate (Gate M) of 1F, indi-
cated in Fig. 3.7 as D3 and D4, has not yet been rigorously identified, the release of 
radioactive materials still continued even after March 16. As a result, rainfall over 
a wide area to the south washed out the plume into the soil, leading to a significant 
increase in the ambient dose rate. This time the decrease in the dose rate was dom-
inated by the radiation decay of the radioactive nuclides. On March 18 and 19, the 
wind blew toward the North direction, and several dose rate peaks were observed 
in Minami-sōma (N 30 km). However, presumably because there was no rainfall, 
these plumes did not deposit material onto the ground (Fig. 3.8, G).
On March 21, although rain fell in Fukushima, the plume did not deposit mate-
rial onto Minami-sōma, because the wind was heading south (Fig. 3.8, H).
This suggests that ground contamination occurred due to both the plume and 
rainfall.
[South 50–100 km from 1F]
Ibaraki prefecture, located south of Fukushima, was subjected to a considerable 
degree of washout/rainout on March 16 and 20, that can be seen from the increase 
of the baseline of the ambient dose rate, having a decay timescale of 131I, 8.02 d 
(Fig. 3.8, I).
Just after the delivery of the plume, the decay of the short-lifetime radioactive 
nucleus was also observed, such as 135I (6.7 h), or 132I in radiative equilibrium 
with 132Te (78 h) (Fig. 3.8, J).
[South >100 km from 1F]
In Tokyo, rain on March 21 washed out the plume and increased the radiation 
dose rate, which led to a minor panic when 131I was detected from the tap water 
source (Fig. 3.8, K).
In Shizuoka, at 360 km from 1F, one can see from the time difference between 
the rain and the increase in the dose rate that the plume arrived during rainy 
weather (Fig. 3.8, L).
This suggests that the plume remains no longer than a few days when new 
plumes are not delivered.
This speculation agrees with the observation of the radioactive material level 
of fallout in Tokyo per day [10]. Usually the fallout lasted around 3–4 days in 
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North < 50 km
Fig. 3.8  Temporal evolution of the ambient dose rate of distant locations. Right axis corre-
sponds to rain. Note Data for office 0.5 km from 1F divided by 10 to scale its temporal behavior 
consistent with that of main gate (GateM) and west gate (GateW)
64 S. Tanaka and S. Kado
March and April. For the purpose of protection from the radioactive exposure, it 
is preferable to watch the dose rate near one’s location and the rain for a few days 
after passage of the plume. In particular, the rain causes cesium deposition onto 
soils, while removal of the deposited cesium is difficult. Therefore, we think that 
covering playgrounds with plastic sheets before it rains might be effective as an 
emergency protection against ground contamination—even a mattress or blanket 
is better than nothing. Some prefectural offices and nuclear power plants provide 
real-time dose rates. It might be preferable if one could watch these data together 
with rain and wind speed given in weather forecasts. At the same time, it might be 
required that not only the government but also scientists provide appropriate infor-
mation about how to interpret the monitored data.
3.4  Evaluations
3.4.1  Approach Based on Radionuclide Release Analysis: 
Model 1
The behavior of released radioactive nuclides is complicated because it is closely 
related to the evolution of the accident. However, we made a rough evaluation, 
assuming that a certain proportion was released from the inventory in the fuel 
existing one day after the scram.
Figure 3.9 is an illustrative image of the behavior of radioactive materials in 
the reactor and their release to the environment. Release to the environment is 
basically composed of two steps: release from fuel (A) and release to the envi-
ronment after release from the fuel (B). The latter release mechanism is com-
plicated because detailed information of reactor damage and RI behavior in the 
damaged reactor is not simple. Radionuclides exist in various chemical forms in 
the RPV, PCV, and reactor building, such as gas, dissolved in water, aerosol, and 
Fig. 3.9  Release fraction of 
leakage from reactor
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solid particle. Entrainment of the species to the gas phase is also important in the 
dynamic or boiling state.
The electric power output, the number of fuel assemblies, and the average burn-
up at the scram of 1F1, 1F2, and 1F3 are (460 MWe, 400, 26 GWd/t), (784 MWe, 
548, 23 GWd/t), and (784 MWe, 548, 22 GWd/t), respectively. Using these data, 
amounts of radionuclides and chemical elements for FP and MA at one day after 
the scram were calculated using the ORIGEN code.2 Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show 
the inventories of radionuclide and chemical elements in 1F1 at one day after the 
scram, respectively.
Inventories in 1F2 and 1F3 at one day after the scram are about 1.5 times those 
for 1F1. The following nuclides were found to be significant based on the pro-
duced amount and half-life: 239Np (2.36 d), 133Xe (5.25 d), 140La (1.68 d), 141Ce 
2
 We made a rough estimate of inventory data on July 2011 with use of ORIGEN 2.2, assuming 
conditions about core and operation of the reactor, which might be considered similar to those of 1F1.
Fig. 3.10  The inventories of radionuclide at 1F1 at one day after scram
Fig. 3.11  Inventories of chemical elements in 1F1 at one day after scram
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(32.51 d), 131I (8.04 d), 137Cs (30.17 y), 134Cs (2.06 y), 89Sr (50.5 d), 90Sr (28.8 y), 
132Te (3.20 d), 129mTe (33.6 d), 238Pu (87.7 y), 239Pu (24,000 y), 241Pu (14.4 y), 
140Ba (12.75 d), 95Zr (64.03 d), 91Y (58.51 d), 127Sb (3.85 d), 99Mo (65.94 h), 3H 
(12.3 y), and 85Kr (10.7 y). The chemical inventory shown in Fig. 3.11 gives us 
important information. For example the inventory of Cs is about ten times larger 
than that of I.
The chemical state can typically be categorized into noble gases (Kr, Xe), vola-
tile materials (I, Cs, Te, H), and low volatile materials (Sr, Y, Pu). The degree of 
volatilization is a key to understanding the release during the accident.
The chemical forms and the location of radioactive materials released from the 
fuel depend on their chemical properties. Noble gases such as Kr and Xe exist in 
the gas phase and were released to the atmosphere by the venting operation. Iodine 
was released as CsI and dissolved in water. However, some chemicals exist in the 
gas phase as I attached to aerosol, I2, and organic iodine. Cs takes the chemical 
forms of CsOH and oxide as well as CsI in the gas phases or in water. Te exists as 
oxide in the gas phase or is dissolved in water. Sr is dissolved in water as a cation 
or exists as oxide in the gas phase or in water. Therefore, aerosols in the gas phase 
might carry these kinds of species.
In order to evaluate the radionuclide release from the fuel, we assumed the two 
cases of the temperature and the duration time as (i) 2,800 °C and 1 h, and (ii) 
2,000 °C and 4 h. We used source terms based on the inventory at 1 h after scram 
for 1F1, 1F2, and 1F3 for simplicity. The fraction of inventory released from the 
fuel is calculated by the release rate constants as shown for these two cases in 
Table 3.2. As can be seen from the comparison, all noble gases and volatile materi-
als were released in both cases. However, the difference in the fraction is remark-
able for Ba, Sr, La, and Pu.
Table 3.2  The fraction of 
inventory released from the 
fuel
2,800 °C 1 h 2,000 °C 4 h
Xe, Kr 100 (%) Xe, Kr 100 (%)
H 100 H 100
Cs 100 Cs 100
I 100 I 100
Te 100 Te 100
Ba 83 Ba 29
Sr 58 Sr 16
Zr 1.7 Zr 0.34
Np 1 Np 0.5
Mo 100 Mo 99
La 1.7 La 0.34
Pu 0.17 Pu 0.034
Am 1 Am 0.5
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Chemical properties such as the vapor pressure of each element must be taken 
into account in the release rate from RPV and PCV as shown in Fig. 3.9. Some 
appropriate assumptions must be made for estimates of released amounts by the 
accident, except for noble gases (fully released). Released radioactive materials 
exist in the water or steam of the RVP and PCV due to their chemical properties 
and damage to the RPV and PCV. Particles in the fuel generated by rapid cooling 
after melting might be dispersed in the water. Some parts of the radionuclide in the 
gas phase were released in the accident. Some part of the species in the liquid 
phase is considered to have been transported to the gas phase by the entrainment. 
The release fraction to the environment from the reactor is very complicated 
because it reflects various events causing RI release, such as seat leakage from the 
flanges or bulbs (including SRV release to a leaking vessel), venting, hydrogen 
explosion, and damage to the suppression chamber. Therefore, we tentatively 
assumed the release fraction [(B) in Fig. 3.9] from the RPV + PCV + Reactor 
Building to the atmosphere considering the vapor pressure of the elements: Xe 
100 %; Kr 100%; Cs 1 %; I 1 %; Te 0.1 %; Sr 10−4; Ba 10−4; Zr 10−4; Np 10−4; 
Pu 10−5; 3H 25 %; etc. In this evaluation we also assumed these releases occurred 
at one day after the scram by the earthquake. Although these assumptions are dif-
ferent from the actual accident scheme, our estimation can give us a fundamental 
understanding of RI release.3
We calculated released amounts to the environment by multiplying the inven-
tory by the release fraction from the fuel [(A) in Fig. 3.9] and by that from the 
reactor [(B) in Fig. 3.9]. The calculation results of amounts released are: 3H 
9.4 × 1014Bq; 85Kr 7.6 × 1016Bq; 89 Sr 3.9 × 1014Bq; 90Sr 3.5 × 1013Bq; 129mTe 
2.9 × 1014Bq; 131I 6.0 × 1016Bq; 133Xe 1.3 × 1019Bq; 137Cs 7.6 × 1015Bq; 134Cs 
7.4 × 1015Bq; 249Np 8.8 × 1013Bq; 241Pu 1.4 × 1010Bq; 241Am 8.9 × 107Bq 
for fuel damage at 2,800 °C for 1 h. The 131I equivalent amount of radionuclide 
is evaluated as 4.9 × 1017Bq using the conversion factor in the INES manual 
(Table 3.3).
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) reported it as 7.7 × 1017Bq 
calculated by the MELCOR code [10].
As to the release points of radioactive materials, they are released from the 
venting stack in accidents without severe damage. However, in the 1F accident, 
these were also released from the disrupted points of the PCV, duct pipes, and the 
reactor building. Moreover, contaminated water was released into the sea through 
the tunnel of 1F2 from a crack in the concrete pit.
3
 Facts to provide evidence about what actually occurred are not fully confirmed. The facts and 
the radionuclide behavior will be made clear within the decommissioning. Therefore, we provide 
assumptions considering those chemical properties.
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3.4.2  Approach Based on Radiation Monitor
3.4.2.1  Result of the Standard Method Based on SPEEDI Simulation: 
Model 3
The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) reported the source term of 131I 
and 137Cs released between March 12 and April 5 based on atmospheric disper-
sion simulations, such as SPEEDI or WSPEEDI. The simulation result for the unit 
release rate (1 Bq h−1) was compared to that obtained by the dust-sampler to nor-
malize the absolute value. They obtained: 150 PBq for 131I, and 12 PBq for 137Cs 
(1 PBq = 1015Bq). In order to obtain the radiological equivalence to 131I release, 
the value for 137Cs was multiplied by 40, yielding the total 131I equivalent release 
of 630 PBq [11, 12]. Minor corrections were made to these data to equal 570 PBq 
(131I: 130 PBq and 137Cs: 11 PBq) on August 22. Note that the reverse estima-
tion based on the SPEEDI simulation has been further improved by including the 
radiation data.
However, the results of the SPEEDI calculation were only disclosed on March 
23, and on April 11. The government finally admitted that more than 5,000 evalu-
ation results had existed from the beginning of the accident, which had not been 
disclosed for fear of public panic.
Table 3.3  The multiplication 
factors based on the 131I 
equivalence which are 
calculated by effective dose 
from external radiation and 
inhalation following the 
INES manual
aSee in detail Appendix C
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Because these evaluations rely on simulation codes and detailed weather data 
inaccessible to the public, we proposed a simple but straightforward estimation 
from the ambient dose rate data, or radiation map, available at many locations.
3.4.2.2  Alternative Method Based on Ground Shine: Model 4
The ratio of the radioactivity A′ in Eq. (3.3) can be determined at the specific time 
when all species of interest can be commonly determined from measurements, 
such as dust sampling, soil analysis, or simulations.
We adopted the Becquerel ratio [131I]:[134Cs]:[137Cs] = 1:1:1 on tcom = April 
10 from air sampling data at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
National Operation System of Japan in Takasaki, Gunma prefecture [13].
In this case, taking tobs = April 5 for instance, the normalized dose ratio can 
be calculated to be 0.21:0.57:0.22 from Eq. (3.3) followed by normalization using 
Eq. (3.4). This ratio agrees with the species-sensitive dose monitoring in Ichihara, 
Chiba prefecture, reported by Japan Chemical Analysis Center [14].
For Eq. (3.5), we corrected data from the dose rate, of locations categorized 
into the following groups.
(i) Inside 20 km no-go zone:
For inside the 20 km no-go zone, TEPCO monitored the dose rate during 
March 30–April 2 and April 18–19, the results of which are listed with the dis-
tance from 1F [15]. The data are shown in Fig. 3.12 as a function of the distance 
from the 1F site. Although the scattering of the data showed significant directional 
dependence, the general trend exhibited the decaying property. Therefore, we per-
formed an exponential decay fitting to determine the rough integral of the dose 









Fig. 3.12  Dose rates at 
locations inside 20 km 
no-go zone, scaled to that on 
March 15 when dominant 
radioactive release occurred
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where, L is the characteristic length of the spatial decay while Dj(0) is the dose 
rate extrapolated to the origin, namely the 1F plant.
(ii) East part of Fukushima prefecture outside the 20 km no-go zone, and 
(iii) West part of Fukushima prefecture:
The administrative authority of Fukushima prefecture conducted gamma dose 
rate monitoring at more than 1,600 schools all over Fukushima except inside the 
20 km circle from 1F during April 4–7, 2011 [16]. In this period, the contribution 
of 131I to the dose rate was still obvious, so it can be used to evaluate the radioac-
tive release. A dose rate map of these data is shown in Fig. 3.134 together with the 
1-dimensional distribution projected along the latitude direction.
It may safely be said that Fukushima Prefecture outside the 20 km no-go zone 
was divided into two parts, East (ii) and West (iii) areas, which are approximately 
equal in size. We distributed 1,370 points to (ii) and 267 points to (iii) depending 
on their location. As a result, one data point in (ii) and (iii) can be regarded as rep-
resenting an area of around 4.57 and 28.6 km2, respectively [area of the half disk 
20 km in radius was removed from the area of half of the prefecture in (ii)].
(iv) Ibaraki prefecture:
Ibaraki Prefecture, located south of Fukushima prefecture, exhibited a relatively 
higher dose rate among the adjacent prefectures. We assumed the excess dose 
4
 Fukushima map from “National Land numerical information (Administrative Divisions, 2011), 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, file: japan_ver71, processed by ESRI 
Japan”.
Fig. 3.13  Dose rate mapping 
of schools in Fukushima 
performed in April. Upper 
diagram is the projection 
along the latitude
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rate of Mito City on April 10, 0.17 µSv/h, as representing the averaged values for 
Ibaraki prefecture.
(v) Tochigi, Chiba, Gunma prefectures, and others:
For a minor correction of the evaluation, the area of these three prefectures was 
regarded as representing ground contamination in distant places. The excess dose 
rate was assumed to be 0.07 µSv/h on April 10.
The largest ambiguity in evaluating the released radioactive materials is in the 
fraction of the ground deposition against the total release. Atmospheric simula-
tions also have a considerable amount of error depending on the modeling.
We had first approximated the fraction at about half. Actually, Ref. [17] 
reported from the atmospheric dispersion model GEARN in WSPEEDI-II that 
these fractions for 131I and 137Cs are 0.44 and 0.46, respectively—i.e., it can be 
suspected that the fraction for 134Cs is also 0.46. However, Ref. [18] implies, 
from a three-dimensional chemical transport model, Models 3 Community Multi-
scale Air Quality (CMAQ), that the fractions for 131I, 134Cs, and 137Cs deposits 
on land were 0.13, 0.22, and 0.22, respectively. We have updated the evaluation 
using these value ranges. The results are shown in Table 3.4. Smaller values are 
the result of adopting Ref. [17] as the fraction for the land deposition, while larger 
values are those adopting Ref. [18].
From these results, the 131I equivalent released radioactive nucleus was evalu-
ated to be 337–782 PBq.
The databases necessary to evaluate the ground contamination are compiled in 
Appendix C. Note that the ambiguity in 137Cs has a large effect on the 131I equiva-
lent value, since the multiplying factor is as large as 40.
In this rough evaluation, different from that of NSC, we did not address the 
daily changes in the release rate, based on the assumption that almost all released 
species had been fallout/rainout/washout and the fraction of those on the land 
Table 3.4  Evaluated ground 
contamination and source 
terms in PBq
aMultiplication factor for 131I equivalent for 134Cs was corrected 
from 3 to 20 (see Appendix C)
131I 134Cs 137Cs
(i) 8.03 0.95 0.93
(ii) 12.5 1.47 1.44
(iii) 2.33 0.27 0.27
(iv) 1.35 0.16 0.16
(v) 1.63 0.19 0.19
Total on land 25.8 3.05 2.98
Land fraction 0.13/0.44 0.22/0.46 0.22/0.46
Source term 199/59 13.8/6.6 13.6/6.5
(factor) (1) (3) (40)
I-eq. 199/59 41.6/20 542/258
(factora) (1) (20)a (40)
I-eq.a 199/59 277/132 542/258
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had contributed to the dose rate. Ambiguity in the fraction that was deposited on 
land also has a direct effect on the evaluation of the source terms. One needs to be 
reminded that this is also true for the other method based on atmospheric transport 
simulation.
3.4.2.3  Crosscheck of the Evaluation
The result in the previous subsection was compared to the June 14 cesium radi-
ation map of Fukushima and adjacent prefectures and was presented by the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) on 
September 30. There were 1,732 data points located in Fukushima prefecture [19, 
20].
By correcting the data to that on March 15, using Eq. (3.5), total ground con-
tamination values scaled on March 15 of Fukushima prefecture of 134Cs and 137Cs 
are 2.5 and 2.6 PBq, yielding source terms of 32 and 470 PBq, respectively, which 
agree well with the sum of our evaluations (i), (ii), and (iii).
Fallout of 131I, 134Cs, and 137Cs has been monitored at specific cities in every 
prefecture in Japan except Fukushima and Miyagi [21]. We summed up the 
monthly fallout in Bq/m2 in each prefecture multiplied by the area of each prefec-
ture in m2, yielding 0.4 PBq for 137Cs. This value roughly agrees with our evalua-
tion for areas in (iv) and (v).
Moreover, we would like to emphasize that these different methods lead to 
results consistent with each other for source term, release rate, dust sampling, fall-
out, and dose rate by ground shine with SF = 0.7 (see Appendix C for detail).
3.4.3  Comparison Between Approaches
Evaluation results based on these approaches are compared in Table 3.5. All of 
them exceeded the criteria of INES accident level 7 (>1016Bq). For compari-
son, results for the Chernobyl accident are also listed. These rough evaluations, 
calculations practically done by hand, were able to obtain approximated release 
amounts of radioactive materials.
It is worthwhile to mention that the total amounts of radionuclides of the 
Chernobyl accident were 1,800 PBq for 131I, and 85 PBq for 137Cs, yielding the 
radiological equivalence of 131I of 5,200 PBq. This is considerably larger than that 
of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The reason for this fact is not only because the 
PCV covers the RPV in the Fukushima case, but also because in the Chernobyl 
case, a massive amount of Cs, I, Sr, and Pu was released to the environment by 
steam explosion of the melted fuel.
The accident level assessment based on INES (see Appendix C) has been per-
formed by the radiological equivalence to 131I for 131I and 137Cs release. The 
release of 134Cs has not been included. Indeed, the effect of 134Cs is small if one 
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uses the wrong radiological equivalence multiplication factor of 3. If one applies, 
however, the correct multiplication factor of 20 instead, the effect of the 134Cs 
release contributes 50 % of that of 137Cs and contributes more than 131I itself. 
Therefore, the (second) author would like to recommend re-evaluating the past 
accident including 134Cs.
3.4.4  Contamination and Environmental Cleanup
The ambient dose rate, surface dose rate, and radioactivity in the soil have been 
measured around the site after the accident. The detailed distribution maps of the 
radiation dose are made with a smaller mesh on June 6–14, and June 27–July 8, 
2011 [22]. Figure 3.14 indicates that massive amounts of radiation fell to the sur-
face of the ground by snowfall after the plume, which contained radioactive mate-
rials released by the rupture at 1F2 (suspected), and had been transported to the 
northwest by wind from the southeast. Although 131I with a half-life of 8 days was 
predominant in the early stage, 134Cs (2.06 y), 137Cs (30 y), and 129mTe (33.6 d) 
are now the main reactive materials. 137Cs with a half-life of 30 years will be a 
major target for cleanup in the future.
The radioactive materials absorbed by particles in the air are detected by dust 
sampling at various points in and out of the site. 89Sr (50.5 d) and 90Sr (29 y) are 
detected in the soil within a range of 20 km from the site. These elements have a 
value range between 1/10 and 1/10,000 that of Cs. These elements may be evidence 
of the fact that they were released in this accident because the half-life of 89Sr is as 
short as 50.5 days. Moreover, 140La, 95Nb, and 110mAg have been detected slightly in 
the soil toward the northwest at a distance of 30 km from the site. A small amount of 
Table 3.5  Comparison between different approaches to evaluate the total release in PBq
Some data have been updated from the initial publication, indicated in parentheses. We kept 131I 
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Pu isotopes was detected and the evaluation of the isotope ratio 238Pu/(239Pu+240Pu) 
indicated that some samples contained released Pu by this accident. MEXT reports 
that the difference in behavior of these elements might account for the wide range of 
detected values and suggests that more detailed investigation is needed.
The amount of released Sr and Pu is estimated to be much less than that of the 
Chernobyl accident in which contamination by Sr and Pu was a severe problem. 
Fig. 3.14  Map of deposition of radioactive cesium (sum of 134Cs and 137Cs) for the land area 
within 80 km of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, reported by MEXT [22]
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Specifically, the highest value of 90Sr/137Cs was 8.2 % for the sample obtained 
at Sōma City, but on average, it was about 0.37 % regardless of the location [23], 
as shown in Fig. 3.15. Simple scaling of the radiological equivalence of averaged 
90Sr release yields about 0.7 PBq from analysis in both Sects. 3.1 and 3.2.2 (=10 
PBq × 0.37 % × 20), that is much smaller than that for the Chernobyl accident of 
160 PBq (131I-eq.), where 90Sr/137Cs was 1/10.
Monitoring of radioactivity under the sea has been executed. Although con-
centration of radioactivity at a sampling point within the harbor of the nuclear 
power plant was high because highly concentrated radioactive water was released 
from the concrete near the sluice gate of 1F2 (i.e., 131I 2.8 × 1015Bq, 134Cs 
9.4 × 1014Bq, 137Cs 9.4 × 1014Bq), concentrations outside the plant, especially in 
the area at a distance of more than 30 km from the plant, was low [11].
The mechanism of soil contamination by Cs depends on the fraction of it 
absorbed on the outer surface of minerals or on the layer structure of clay. While 
an effective method for desorption of Cs from clay has not yet been found, it is 
expected in the future. Various ways of cleanup of paddy soils should be taken 
depending on the level of contamination: stripping surface soil, elimination of clay 
particles by plowing, and removal of vegetation. Effective decontamination meth-
ods for soil, which includes methods for disposal of secondary waste, are essential 
for allowing the return of evacuated residents to their homes if the evacuation zone 
is to be reopened. For secondary waste from decontamination, temporary keeping, 
interim storage, and final disposal are required depending on the radiation level. 
Communication among stakeholders, residents, local governments, and the cen-
tral government is crucial in the process of determining sites to locate this waste. 
Academic societies should play an important role by supplying scientific informa-
tion on RI behavior and safety evaluation for storage and disposal.
3.5  Summary and Conclusion
We have seen that the release of radionuclides is subject to the physical and chem-
ical properties and composition of the fuel core, which is highly dependent on its 
temperature. The source term can be evaluated by the fraction of the release to the 
environment. The integrated source term can also be evaluated alternatively based 
Fig. 3.15  Becquerel Ratio 
of 90Sr/137Cs [%] as a 
function of the distance from 
1F. Color of dots corresponds 
to the latitude, but no clear 
tendency has been observed. 
Data from [23]
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on radiation monitoring by assuming the fraction of the land deposition, or by 
making use of atmospheric simulation. Although the exact value of the radioactive 
release has considerable ambiguity, the amount of the release derived from these 
methods is roughly consistent, and is considerably less than that released by the 
Chernobyl accident.
The atmospheric diffusion/transport mechanism of each nuclide has not yet 
been fully understood. However, in the present situation, Cs is considered to be 
the most serious radionuclide while the other nuclides may have minor effects on 
the environment. The environmental behavior of each species must still be investi-
gated from both scientific and political points of view to find a better roadmap for 
decontamination procedures.
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Appendix A: Pasquill-Gifford Dispersion Diagrams
The diffusion parameters in Eq. (3.2), σy and σz, are functions of distance from the 
source in the x direction. The Pasquill-Gifford curves (Fig. 3.5) are constructed 
from observations over smooth terrain and represent averages over a few minutes 
[7]. In practical calculation, the parameter σi (i = y, z) can be approximated as a 
function of the distance x[m],
where γi and αi are the constants indicated for the stability classes and x [24]. 
Figure 3.5 is plotted using Eq. (3.8). The stability is classified (as shown in 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7) by tendency of diffusion into unstable (A–C), neutral (D) and 
stable (E–F). In Japan, stability class G, which means extremely stable, is added to 
the existing classes A–F.
Appendix B: Flash Boiling of Water
Water tends to condense more at higher pressures. The saturated vapor Psat [atm] 
above 1 atm can be empirically approximated as a function of the temperature T 
[°C] by the Antoine equation proposed in 1888,
where {c0, c1, c2} are {8.07131, 1,730.63, 233.426} for 1 < T < 100, while 
{8.14019, 1,810.94, 244.485} for 99 < T < 374.
(3.8)σi = γi · xαi
(3.9)logPsat = C0 − C1/(C2 + T)
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Table 3.6  Approximation 
constant for σy
Stability αy γy x (m)
A 0.901 0.426 0–1,000
0.851 0.602 1,000–
B 0.914 0.282 0–1,000
0.865 0.396 1,000–
C 0.924 0.1772 0–1,000
0.885 0.232 1,000–
D 0.929 0.1107 0–1,000
0.889 0.1467 1,000–
E 0.921 0.0864 0–1,000
0.897 0.1019 1,000–
F 0.929 0.0554 0–1,000
0.889 0.0733 1,000–
G 0.921 0.0380 0–1,000
0.896 0.0452 1,000–
Table 3.7  Approximation 
constant for σz
Stability αz γz x (m)
A 1.122 0.0800 0–300
1.514 0.00855 300–500
2.109 0.000212 500–
B 0.964 0.1272 0–500
1.094 0.0570 500–
C 0.918 0.1068 0–
D 0.826 0.1046 0–1,000
0.632 0.400 1,000–10,000
0.555 0.811 10,000–
E 0.788 0.0928 0–1,000
0.565 0.433 1,000–10,000
0.415 1.732 10,000–
F 0.784 0.0621 0–1,000
0.526 0.370 1,000–10,000
0.323 2.41 10,000–




In 1993, Wagner and Pruss [25] proposed the equation that is valid for 
0.01 ≤ T < 374 °C as:
(3.10)
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where τ = 1 − (T + 273.15)/647.096 and {c0, c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6} are {−7.85951783, 
1.84408259, −11.7866497, 22.6807411, −15.9618719, 1.80122502}.
This function form is more useful in that the coefficients are usable over the 
range from the experimentally given triple point and the critical point, and that 
this form also copes well with its derivatives. Thus, it has been approved by the 
International Association for the Properties of Water and Steam. Other various for-
mulas can be found in Ref. [26].
The calculated result of T as a function of Psat is shown in Fig. 3.16. For exam-
ple, the sudden decrease of pressure, say from 70 to 1 atm, by valving on the SRV, 
leads to a sudden drop in the vaporization temperature from 290 to 100 °C. As 
a result, quite rapid evaporation of the water, called “flash boiling,” in the RPV 
might occur. Therefore, water injection needs to be started at the same time as, or 
at least as soon as, the SRV is opened.
Appendix C: Ground Shine of Gamma Ray Radiation
C.1 Half-Value Layer
External exposure from the contaminated ground is called “ground shine.” The 
required database is compiled in [27]. Due to absorption/scattering by air, the 
radiation was attenuated. The characteristic lengths at which the radiation becomes 
Fig. 3.16  Saturated vapor 
pressure by Wagner’s 
equation
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half, the half-value layer (HVL), of lead, iron, aluminum, water, air, and concrete 
are compiled in Table E2 of Ref. [27].
Roughly speaking, the dose rate from ground shine reflects the area inside the 
circle of several times the air HVL in the radius. Each point of Figs. 3.12 and 3.15 
represents at least 4.57 or 4 km2, respectively. Therefore, the influence of one area 
on adjacent points in the MEXT monitoring that could cause a double-counting of 
the dose rate are eliminated.
C.2 Dose Factor
Conversion factors from [Bq/m2] to [Sv/h] listed in Table E3 [27] include effective 
dose rate for external dose and committed inhalation due to resuspension resulting 
from remaining on contaminated ground. However, since the inhalation dose for 
the present situation is considerably small, this database can also be used for the 
pure external dose.
The shielding factor (SF) needs to be considered, since the evaluation above is 
the ideal case where the ground is smoothly spread over the infinite disk. For ordi-
nary ground cases, Ref. [27] proposed using SF of 0.47–0.85 (representative of 
0.7). In addition, the dose factors for plume submersion, crucial in the early stage 
of accidents, is calculated in Table 3.1 of Ref. [28].
C.3 Radiological Equivalence
Radiological equivalence is the ratio of the activity released of a specified radio-
nuclide to the case for 131I. This value is used to classify the scale of the acci-
dent as described in [29]. It considers the above mentioned ground contamination 
and plume submersion. The database for the total effect on the public is given in 
Table 15 in Appendix I of Ref. [29].
Data are listed in Table 3.8 for species of interest. Although 134Cs is the present 
leading radiator, 137Cs is the most crucial nucleus in the evaluation of the rating of 
the accident. Evaluation of 90Sr is less effective due to both its low concentration 
(approximately below 1 % of 137Cs) and its low radiological equivalence (half of 
137Cs).
It should be noted that the official data of 131I eq. of 134Cs has significant 
error. This is caused by the significant error of the 50 years dose factor for 
134Cs tabulated in Table E3 in [27]. The correct value is 5.1E-02 rather than 
5.1E-03.
This error has been taken into account in the International Nuclear and 
Radiological Event Scale (INES) defined in [29]. As a result, the radiological 
equivalence to 131I summarized in Table 2 of the INES user guide, I-eq, for 
134Cs has been under-estimated to 2.8 (~3) which, in reality, should be 16.2 
(~20).
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Note: The second author noticed this mistake and sent a letter to MEXT and to 
the Nuclear Regulation Authority in October 2012 [30]. MEXT sent it to the IAEA 
through diplomatic channels. Finally, after several reminders, the IAEA issued the 
corrigendum of Refs. [27, 29] in March 2013. Now I-eq for 134Cs has been cor-
rected to 17 in Table 2 of [29]. Tables 15 and 16 have yet to be corrected; they 
should be 17 and 20 (1 digit), respectively.
C.4 Experimental Determination of the Shielding Factor (SF)
Assessment of the relationship between the ground contamination and the result-
ant ambient dose rate needs careful consideration of the definition of the quantity 
used in the database.
In order to clarify the definition, we described the relation in the Eq. (3.11) as:
The dose factor CFgrd represents the ambient dose rate at 1 m above ground 
level per unit of deposition for a radionuclide. In the most commonly used data-
base [27], this factor is calculated using the RASCAL code (ver. 3.0.5), con-
sidering a ground roughness factor (GRF) of 0.7, considering ordinary ground 
(Eq. 3.12). Note that GRF = 1 corresponds to the case for a smooth infinite field 
of lawn. Shielding factor is defined by the Kerma in the shielding material divided 
by the Kerma for the infinite smooth surface (Eq. 3.13).




= A · CFgrd(w/oGRE) · SFtot ·
1
H∗(10)/K
(3.12)CFgrd(w/GRF) = CFgrd(w/oGRF) · GRF




= A · CFgrd(w/GRE) · SFBLG ·
1
H∗(10)/K
Table 3.8  Dataset to assess 
radiological equivalence to 
131I
Nucleus τ Air HVL (m) (Sv/h)/(Bq/m2) 131I eq.
131I 8.0 d 55.9 1.30E−12 1
134Cs 2.06 y 71.9 5.40E−12 3 → 20
137Cs 50 y 69.2 2.10E−12 40
89Sr 50.5 d 80.5 8.0E−15 0.5
90Sr 29.1 y – 1.0E−15 20
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H*(10)/K is the conversion factor from Kerma [Gy] to 1 cm ambient dose 
equivalent [Sv], for which a typical value of 1.3 following the data tabulated in 
Ref. [31] might be a plausible approximation for sub-MeV photon.
Note that for the emergency situation, 1 Gy/h ≈ 1 Sv/h, is usually proposed 
and the data provided for the accident has been provided in this approximation. 
Therefore, it is necessary to treat the measured dose rate as the form of (D/1.3) 
(Gy/h).
The shielding factor can also be evaluated by comparing the dose rate calcu-
lated from the measured ground contamination using Eq. (3.14) with the measured 
dose rate, as shown in Fig. 3.17. In the fitting procedure, we fixed the baseline cor-
responding to the background natural radiation dose. 
One can see that the (SFBLD/1.3) = 0.7, by fitting where dose rate <10 µSv/h 
(adopted because of the large number of data points), is a plausible value in the 
general discussion, which corresponds to SFBLD = 0.9. Because the scattering of 
data is considerably large, it may be misleading if one calculates external exposure 
from the local ground contamination. The dose rate used was the averaged, namely 
effective, value around the measurement point.
The inverse determination of the ground contamination from the measured dose 
rate can be evaluated as



















Fig. 3.17  Measured 
dose rates assuming 
1 Sv/h = 1 Gy/h versus those 
evaluated from the ground 
shine with GRF = 0.7. 
Background dose rate of 
0.06 µSv/h was assumed
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